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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN THRIFT STORES, 
INC., et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
et al., 
Defendants and Appellees. 
BRIEF OF CITY APPELLEES 
Case No. 910471 
JURISDICTION 
Appellants, Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc., et al., 
("Thrift Stores") claims jurisdiction for this appeal pursuant to 
"UCA Rule 78-22" [sic] and "Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure" [sic]. The Salt Lake City Corporation appellees ("the 
City"J1 suggest that appellate jurisdiction is actually 
conferred pursuant to Rule 3, Utah R. ATDTO. P. , and Section 78-2-2, 
Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was the District Court correct in finding that Thrift 
Stores failed to establish, as a matter of law, duty, breach of 
duty, proximate cause or damages on behalf of the City concerning 
the flood of 1983? 
2. Were the actions of the City immune from liability 
1Other appellees whose appearance is made in this Brief 
include Ted Wilson (the former Mayor of Salt Lake City) Al Haynes 
[Haines] (the former assistant to the Mayor) City Engineer Max 
Peterson and Assistant City Engineer Rick Johnston. 
pursuant to provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
Section 63-30-1, et seq., Utah Code Ann.? 
3. What is the appropriate standard for this Court's 
review when summary judgment below was based, in part, on a 
complete failure by Thrift Stores to comply with Rule 4-501(2) (b) 
of the Code of Judicial Administration in failing to dispute with 
any admissible evidence the Undisputed Facts provided to the 
District Court by the City? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Upon review of a grant of a Motion for Summary Judgment, 
this Court gives no deference to the determination of the 
district court and reviews the court's legal conclusions for 
correctness. Sanderson v. First Security Leasing Company, 844 
P.2d 303, 306 (Utah 1992). Appellate review of a grant of 
summary judgment also requires this Court to "view the facts and 
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party."2 Id. 
2The City argues in Point VII, below, that this standard of 
review is inappropriate in a case, such as this, where summary 
judgment was granted, in part, because of the failure by the 
party opposing summary judgment to comply with Rule 4-501(2)(b), 
of the Code of Judicial Administration. This rule requires that 
"undisputed facts" submitted by the party moving for summary 
judgment be specifically replied to with admissible evidence in a 
prescribed format. The City contends that the standard of review 
in such situations should be similar to that which this Court 
applies to a brief which violates Rule 24, Utah R.App.P., which 
places the presumptions in favor of the party complying with the 
Rules. This standard of review would also be similar to that 
which this Court uses where the losing party below fails to 
properly object to the evidence or fails to ask for the necessary 
jury instructions. See, Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1389, 
1319 (Utah 1987); Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778 (Utah 1986); 
and, Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 
2 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES 
See Addendum "1" attached hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Thrift Stores filed this action against the City and the 
other governmental defendants claiming that actions taken by the 
defendants in managing the catastrophic floods of 1983 were 
negligent and damaged the operation of various businesses 
associated with Thrift Stores. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
In Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City 
Corporation, 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989) ("Thrift Stores I"), this 
Court partially reversed an earlier grant of summary judgment in 
favor of the City and the other defendants.3 This Court 
remanded this case with instructions to the District Court to 
determine whether the actions of the City and the other 
governmental defendants qualified as immune "policy" decisions or 
1991) . 
3Thrift Stores spends a large portion of its Brief arguing 
that this Court, in Thrift Stores I, mandated that the District 
Court hold a "full evidentiary hearing". (Thrift Stores7 Brief, 
pp. 9, 12 and 2 9.) In fact, this Court mandated no such thing. 
The only discussion of a "full evidentiary hearing" came in the 
context of this Court's noting that the original grant of Summary 
Judgment had been made before any evidentiary basis had been laid 
below. Thrift Stores I, 784 P.2d at 464. This Court did not 
"mandate" a trial below. Instead, this Court remanded the case 
for the determination of evidence on a finite number of issues. 
Through discovery such an evidentiary determination was made. 
All of Thrift Stores' claims were found to be without any 
evidentiary support and, thus, properly subject to Summary 
Judgment. 
3 
whether the decisions were "operational", in which case the 
defendants may not be immune. 
This Court also remanded Thrift Stores' allegations of 
negligence against the City that were based on "inspections", 
"latent defects" or "discretionary functions" for which immunity 
was retained pursuant to Section 63-30-10, U.C.A. Finally, this 
Court instructed the District Court, on remand, to consider all 
of the other additional defenses raised by the City and the other 
defendants. Since Thrift Stores 1 was decided on a motion to 
dismiss, the underlying issues of negligence liability (e.g. 
duty, breach, causation and damages) also remained to be 
considered on remand. 
On remand, the parties engaged in discovery including the 
deposing of Thrift Stores' purported experts on liability and 
damages. After the discovery cut-off, Thrift Stores certified 
readiness for trial. The City and County defendants moved for 
summary judgment.4 As required by Rule 56, U.R.C.P., and Rule 
4-501(2) (a), C.J.A., the City supported its Motion for Summary 
Judgment with 57 Undisputed Facts supported by 29 Exhibits of 
admissible evidence. 
In its Memorandum in Opposition to the City's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Thrift Stores failed to contravene any of the 
City's Undisputed Facts or support any of its own claims with 
specific references to admissible evidence as required by Rule 4-
4The State of Utah defendants had been dismissed earlier on 
a separate motion. 
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501(2) (b) , C.J.A. The District Court noted this failure in its 
Summary Decision and Order: 
[Thrift Stores'! responses to [the City and County's 
Motions for Summary Judgment] is wholly inadequate. 
[Thrift Stores has] failed to adhere to [the! 
requirements of Rule 4-501(2)(b). This failure is 
significant in a complex case such as this where 
adherence to the rules is a necessity for the Court to 
sort through complex theories, allegations and factual 
setting. If the Court in this Summary Decision has 
misapprehended or failed to acknowledge any genuine 
issue of material fact, it is because [Thrift Stores 
has] not adhered to Rule 4-501 or otherwise submit 
[its] theories and evidence in an understandable 
manner. 
(R. 1576-7; emphasis added.) 
Despite Thrift Stores complete failure to aid the District 
Court in reviewing this case, the Court went, as it said, "the 
extra step" of reviewing virtually the entire record to find any 
proof, submitted by Thrift Stores, of negligence, causation or 
damages. The District Court ferreted out six areas where Thrift 
Stores was apparently claiming negligence against the City. The 
District Court exhaustively searched the record for any 
admissible evidence which might establish that any of these six 
claims might amount to actionable negligence by the City. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
The District Court entered its conclusions in a Summary 
Decision and Order. (R. 1576-82; attached as Addendum #2 to this 
Brief.) Despite its exhaustive review, the District Court could 
find no admissible evidence of duty, breach, causation or damages 
against the City. Further, the District Court found that the 
City was immune from some of Thrift Stores' claims pursuant to 
5 
the "inspection immunity" of Section 63-30-10 (1) (d) , U.C.A. (See 
Addendum "1" for text of statute as it read at the pertinent 
time. For the current text, see Section 63-30-10(4).) The 
District Court also found that Thrift Stores had failed to prove 
any "special duty" owed by the City to Thrift Stores. The 
District Court, therefore, entered an Order of Summary Judgment. 
(R. 1586-91.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS5 
THE DRAINAGE SYSTEM BEFORE THE 1983 FLOOD. 
1. The City Creek/North Temple conduit flood drainage 
system was initially constructed and designed in several segments 
from 1892 to about 1925 to manage the storm drainage flowing out 
of City Creek Canyon. This storm drainage management system 
included the construction of a five foot diameter pipe ("the 
North Temple conduit") that runs under what is now known as North 
Temple Street and which empties into the Jordan River. (Salt 
Lake City's Answers to Interrogatories Nos. 6 and 7 ("SLC's 
Answers"), which were attached and incorporated with the City's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment as Exhibit 
5Because Thrift Stores failed to properly dispute any of the 
57 Undisputed Facts supported by 2 9 Exhibits of admissible 
evidence provided in the City's Memorandum in Support of Summary 
Judgment, the City's undisputed facts must be taken as true 
pursuant to Rule 4-501(2), C.J.A. and Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P. The 
City's Facts below are actually undisputed and adequately 
supported by indisputable record references. Further, because 
Thrift Stores failed to support any of its "facts" in opposition 
to summary judgment with specific references to admissible 
evidence, this Court should not consider any such alleged "facts" 
pursuant to Rule 4-501(2) (b), C.J.A. (See Point VII, below.) 
6 
"A"6; R. 1016-17. Affidavit of Rick Johnston and Max Peterson 
("Johnston/Peterson Affidavit"), p.2, Exhibit "B"; R. 1030.) 
2. In 1982, responsibility for maintenance and operation 
of all the flood management systems within Salt Lake County, 
including the North Temple conduit, was transferred by statute to 
Salt Lake County. (Section 17-8-5, U.C.A., and Section 7-2-1, et 
seq. of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County. Holzworth 
deposition, pp. 30-32, 41, Exhibit "D"; R. 1102-4, 1106. 
Johnston/Peterson Affidavit, Exhibit "B", at p. 3; R. 1031, and 
Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit; R. 1037-40. SLC's Answers No. 5, 
Exhibit "A"; R. 1015-16.) 
3. North Temple Street between State Street and the Jordan 
River, at all times relevant to this action, was operated and 
maintained by the State of Utah as a State road. (Blaine Kay 
deposition, pp. 4 and 33, Exhibit "E"; R. 1114 and 1115. 
Sections 27-12-7 and 49.1, U.C.A.) 
4. The North Temple conduit has a design capacity in a 
clean, unpressurized condition of approximately 13 0 cubic feet 
per second of water and can carry approximately 250 cfs. of 
pressurized flow. (SLC's Answers Nos. 8 and 9, Exhibit "A"; 
R.1017-18. Call deposition, p. 25, Exhibit "F"; R. 1021. 
Peterson deposition, p. 57, Exhibit "H"; R. 1142.) 
5. In September of 1982, an intense thunderstorm sent up 
6Exhibits attached to the City's Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment will be referred to in this Brief 
with the Exhibit designation below and a reference to their page 
numbers in the Record on Appeal, pursuant to Rule 24(e), Utah 
R.App.P. 
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to 257 cfs. of clean urban storm water (not from City Creek 
Canyon) through the North Temple conduit, which would have 
cleared any obstructions out the conduit. (Mitckes Affidavit, 
Exhibit "I"; R. 1149-1163.) 
6. Prior to the late May 1983 floods, most of the North 
Temple conduit had been visually inspected as a precautionary 
measure from some of the manholes by Stan Butts, an employee of 
the City. He observed water freely flowing through the pipe and 
saw no obvious blockages. Butts also probed the water flow with 
a "flume bar" and found only a small layer of sand and silt at 
the bottom of the pipe. (Butts Affidavit, Exhibit "K"; R. 1167-
9. Call deposition, pp. 31-32, Exhibit "F"; R. 1122-3.) 
THE FLOODS OF 1983. 
7. During the winter of 1982 and the spring of 1983, the 
Utah received an abnormally high snowfall resulting in an 
anticipated higher-than-average spring runoff. (Thrift Stores If 
784 P.2d at 460. Holzworth deposition, p. 5, Exhibit "D"; R. 
1101. Complaint, paragraph 18; R. 6. SLC's Answer No. 17, 
Exhibit "A"; R. 1024-5.) 
8. Beginning in late May of 1983, the temperature suddenly 
warmed to abnormally high levels causing the accumulated snow 
pack to rapidly melt and produce a runoff exceeding that which 
occurs once in every 100 years. This increased runoff was 
further exacerbated by several intense thunderstorms. (Exhibit 
"B" to the Johnston/Peterson Affidavit (Emergency Declaration and 
Expenditure Resolution - Resolution 52 of 1983), Exhibit "A"; R. 
8 
1041-4. Call deposition, p. 9, Exhibit "F"; R. 1120. Haines 
deposition, p. 10, Exhibit "G"; R. 1128.) 
9. Flooding occurred in all of the various canyons and 
streams throughout Salt Lake County and all along the Wasatch 
Front. (Holzworth deposition, pp. 41-42, Exhibit "D"; R. 1106-7. 
Peterson deposition, pp. 70-72, Exhibit "H"; R. 1144-6. 
Johnston/Peterson Affidavit, pp. 3-4, Exhibit "B"; R. 1031-2.) 
10. In late May of 1983, because Salt Lake County's 
resources were fully occupied fighting other flooding, the City 
agreed to use City personnel and to coordinate thousands of 
volunteers in fighting the flood waters within Salt Lake City 
including, but not limited to, the City Creek/North Temple 
problem. (Haines deposition, p. 11, Exhibit "G"; R. 1129. 
Holzworth deposition, pp. 32-33, 53, Exhibit "D"; R. 1104-5, 
1108.) 
11. At various times, on several days during the flood, the 
North Temple conduit transmitted up to 2 00 cubic feet per second 
of storm water (approximately 160 percent of unpressurized 
capacity) from the inlet in Memory Grove and emptying into the 
Jordan River. (Exhibit "1 to the Holzworth deposition, Exhibit 
"D"; R. 1111. Haines deposition, p. 11, Exhibit "G"; R. 1129. 
Mitckes and Call Affidavits, Exhibits "I" and "J" respectively; 
R. 1149-63 and R. 1164-6.) 
12. At some point during the flood, City and County 
executives managing the flood emergency control center made a 
policy decision to divert the flood waters through a man-made 
9 
channel down State Street emptying into other pipes for transit 
to the Jordan River. This policy was made before the conduit 
under North Temple was plugged and was based upon the 
hydrologists' estimation that flows would peak at 350 cubic feet 
per second and exceed the capacity of the North Temple drainage 
system. (Haines deposition, pp. 11-12, Exhibit "G"; R. 1129-30.) 
13. At some point during the floods, approximately Monday 
night May 30, 1983, (although the date varies slightly between 
witnesses) the North Temple conduit became plugged.7 Haines 
deposition, p. 12 (Sunday May 29, 1983), Exhibit "G"; R. 1130. 
Peterson deposition, pp. 20, 26-27 and 53 (conduit became 
entirely plugged on night of 3rd of June), Exhibit "H"; R. 1136-
9. Call deposition, pp. 8-9 (June 3, 1983), Exhibit "F"; R. 
1119-20. SLC's Answers No. 14, (the conduit began to clog on May 
2 8 but no statement specifies when the conduit became completely 
plugged); R. 1020-3.) 
14. The City crews attempted to clear the clog in the North 
Temple conduit by various means including the use of a "drag 
bucket", fire hoses, explosives and augers. (Salt Lake City's 
Answers No. 14; R. 1020-3.) 
15. The City finally determined to clear the North Temple 
clog by digging completely through the road surface, breaking 
through the conduit and cleaning out the debris with a backhoe. 
(See Salt Lake City's Answers No. 14; R. 1020-3.) 
7Thrift Stores has made no allegation that the actual date 
of plugging is in any way material to its claims of negligence in 
this action. 
10 
16. Except for possibly a few brief intervals, all of 
Thrift Stores' properties had alternative access from streets and 
roads other than North Temple. (Haines deposition, p. 33, 
Exhibit "GM; R. 1131. Peterson deposition, p. 63, Exhibit "H"; 
R. 1143.); 
17. An economic analysis showed that business continued at 
all of the Thrift Stores' businesses after the floods. (Exhibits 
"2n-M15n to the Norman deposition, Exhibit "S"; R. 1257-80. ) 8 
18. Thrift Stores never provided to the City or the 
District Court any calculation regarding damages.9 (Undisputed 
Facts U1J24-52 an<3 the accompanying Exhibits to the City's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; R. 986-91 
and 1193-1321.)10 
8In fact, for some months, the revenues of Thrift Stores 
actually increased on a year-to-year basis from 1982 to 1983. 
See Exhibit "11" to the Norman deposition and compare the 
revenues for the Site Lounge from August 1982 of $3,514 with 
August of 1983 of $4,290. (R. 1267-9). On Exhibit "13" compare 
the revenues of Rancho Lanes in August of 1982 at $21,266 with 
August of 1983 at $31,011, September of 1982 at $48,967 with 
September of 1983 at $62,106, October of 1982 at $62,069 with 
October of 1983 at $66,965. (R. 1272-4.) On Exhibit "14", for 
the Se Rancho Motor Hotel, compare the months of September 1982 
at $40,811 with September 1983 at $43,776. (R. 1275-6.) 
9The only damage evidence referenced in Thrift Stores Brief 
to this Court is to an Affidavit of Barry Sine which is simply 
not in the Record on Appeal. (See Point IV, below.) In addition 
to not being in the Record, the Affidavit is inadmissible as 
hearsay and completely lacks any foundation. The City objected 
to any mention of this unsubmitted Affidavit below and has moved 
to strike the Affidavit from Thrift Stores Brief. 
10In failing to provide any proof of damages, Thrift Stores 
repeatedly failed to comply with discovery orders; failed to 
provide documents; and, omitted any reference to this action as 
an asset of the estate while under oath in at least two 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
11 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Point I. 
The City had no duty to undertake any inspection or 
maintenance for flood control. Flood control was the statutory 
and actual responsibility of the County. Further, the City had 
no "special duty" to Thrift Stores to inspect or maintain the 
conduit. Even if the City had a duty, the conduit was actually 
inspected prior to the flood and found to be clean. Any 
testimony to the contrary by Thrift Stores7 expert is, by his own 
admission, only speculation that something "could" have happened. 
Finally, Thrift Stores failed to present any evidence of damages. 
Point II. 
Any duty to inspect or maintain the conduit would have been 
immunized from liability under either the "inspection" or 
"discretionary function" immunities of Section 63-30-10(1) (a) or 
(d), U.C.A. 
Point III. 
Thrift Stores' second negligence claim regarding the "drag 
bucket" is not supported by any admissible evidence. Thrift 
Stores' purported expert admittedly has no expertise in the 
management of floods in emergency situations. Thrift Stores' 
expert admitted that use of the "drag bucket" would have been 
reasonable if it had been successfully used in other situations, 
which was indisputably shown by other testimony to be true. 
Further, there is no testimony whatsoever that use of the "drag 
bucket" caused any damage to Thrift Stores. 
12 
Point IV. 
The City's use of the "drag bucket" was immunized as a 
"discretionary function" pursuant to Section 63-30-10 (1) (a) , 
U.C.A. 
Point V. 
Thrift Stores' attempts, in superficial fashion, to raise 
four or five other claims of negligence by the City. The 
District Court was correct in concluding that there is absolutely 
no evidentiary support for any of these other claims. 
Point VI. 
Thrift Stores' claims against the individual defendants are 
unsupported by any claim or evidence of "fraud or malice" on 
their part. Accordingly the individual defendants must be 
dismissed pursuant to Section 63-30-4, U.C.A. 
Point VII. 
Finally, while the City adamantly denies that any material 
issues of fact are genuinely disputed, the City urges this Court 
to adopt a standard of review in cases such as this different 
from the traditional standard of review on summary judgments. 
Where summary judgment was granted, in part, because of a total 
failure, by the opponent, to comply with the provisions of Rule 
4-501(2)(b) of the Code of Judicial Administration, this Court 
should review the grant of summary judgment with the presumptions 




THE CITY WAS NOT NEGLIGENT CONCERNING A 
"PROGRAM" OF INSPECTING OR MAINTAINING THE 
CONDUIT. 
Thrift Stores claims that the City, because of the design of 
the North Temple system and the forecast of a potential flood, 
owed a duty to the public in general to have a program of routine 
inspection and/or maintenance of the North Temple conduit and to 
ensure that the conduit was clean. (R. 1549.) In Utah, a 
plaintiff must establish four elements to sustain a claim of 
actionable negligence: 1) the defendant owed a duty; 2) the 
defendant breached the duty; 3) the breach of that duty was the 
proximate cause of an injury; and 4) there was, in fact, an 
injury or damages. Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, (Utah 1991). 
Plaintiff fails in each of these elements. 
A. Duty. 
1. General duty. 
Maintenance and operation of the flood control system within 
the boundaries of Salt Lake County, including the North Temple 
conduit, was the legal and actual responsibility of Salt Lake 
County. (Fact No. 3.) Thus, the City had no general duty to 
Thrift Stores nor anyone else to inspect or maintain the conduit 
prior to the flood. Since the duty of flood control was the 
actual and legal responsibility of Salt Lake County, the City 
owed no duty and was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of 
law. 
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2. Special duty. 
The District Court granted Summary Judgment on the basis 
that Thrift Stores had failed to establish the "special duty" 
owed by the City to Thrift Stores as required by Feree v. State, 
784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989). This Court has recently reiterated the 
applicability of the "special duty" doctrine in Madsen v. 
Borthick, P.2d , 210 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 7 (Utah 1993) . This 
Court held: 
To hold a government agency or one of its agent liable 
for negligence . . . a plaintiff cannot recover for the 
breach of a duty owed to the general public, but must 
show that a duty is owed to him or her as an 
individual. 
* * * 
Thus, for plaintiff's claim to survive, they must 
establish the existence of a special relationship that 
imposes a duty of care on the [defendants] for the 
benefit of plaintiffs as individuals. 
(Emphasis added, c i t a t i o n s omitted.)1 1 
Thrift Stores argues in its Brief (pp. 22-3) that the 
"special duty" to Thrift Stores is established by the 
predictability of the flood and the City's ability to control the 
flood. This undocumented claim cannot withstand the undisputed 
facts in the Record. First the flood was of a magnitude likely 
i:LTrapp v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 835 P. 2d 161 (Utah 
1992), is readily distinguishable. Trapp involved the non-
delegable duty to maintain open-air public sidewalks over which 
pedestrians traveled daily. Trapp did not involve inspection or 
maintenance of a physical facility which would become necessary 
only in the event on a 100-plus year emergency. Emergency floods 
are even less "inherently [ ] controllable" than human beings and 
thus the special duty analysis of Feree and Borthick should be 
fully applicable. Id. 
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to occur less than one in 100 years. (Fact No. 8.) For all 
practical purposes it was thus completely unpredictable. While 
everyone knew that a large snowpack existed in the mountains in 
1983, no one could reasonably predict that the temperature would 
unseasonably skyrocket and that heavy thunderstorms would 
exacerbate the unpredictable flood far beyond anyone's reasonable 
ability to control it. 
The City, acting in the most dire of emergency 
circumstances, volunteered to perform services which were not 
among its statutory or legal responsibilities. There is nothing 
in the record to indicate that the City intended to, or did, 
assume a special relationship with Thrift Stores. Rather, the 
City was acting in the best interest of the general public. 
B. Breach of duty. 
It is axiomatic that if no duty was owed, there can be no 
breach. Such is the case in this matter. Assuming arguendo, 
however, that some duty could be established, there was no breach 
and, a fortiori, no negligence. 
The City, despite having no responsibility for managing the 
North Temple conduct system, conducted a visual and manual 
inspect the conduit prior to the flood and found no blockages. 
(Fact No. 6.) A lack of a routine inspection or maintenance 
program could not have been the proximate cause of the clog, as a 
matter of law, because the undisputed testimony of Mitckes, Call 
and Butts establishes that the conduit was, in fact, clean prior 
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to the May floods.12 (Exhibits "I", "J" and "K"; R 1149-63, 
1164-6 and 1167-9.) 
C. Proximate cause. 
In this matter, with each review of the various elements, it 
becomes progressively more difficult for Thrift Stores to sustain 
its burden. There simply is no admissible evidence that the 
City's inspection, or the alleged lack thereof, caused any injury 
to Thrift Stores. To the contrary, the evidence clearly and 
uncontrovertedly demonstrates that in September, 1982, the 
conduit carried clear storm water in excess of the amount which 
would have cleaned the conduit from any existing impediments. 
(Fact No. 5.) Thus, regardless of whether the conduit was 
inspected in the winter and spring of 1983 prior to the flood, 
any lack of inspection or maintenance could not be negligent or 
have proximately caused any injury to Thrift Stores. 
Where the matters alleged to be negligent "are outside the 
knowledge and experience of lay people, expert [ ] testimony [is] 
12Thrift Stores' Brief implies that County Flood Director 
Terry Holzworth testified conclusively that the North Temple 
conduit had not been inspected prior to the flood. (Thrift 
Stores' Brief, pp. 7 and 14 citing to the Holzworth deposition, 
p. 6; R. 581.) In fact, the cited testimony of Holzworth does 
not go anywhere near that far. At most Holzworth states the 
County did not clean out the conduit. Holzworth was never asked 
about, and did not deny, the undisputed testimony showing that 
the City inspected the conduit and found that it was clean. 
(Fact No. 6.) (See a more detailed description of the Holzworth 
testimony in Salt Lake County's Brief, pp. 17-20.) The record 
citation provided to the Holzworth deposition by Thrift Stores is 
in error. The Index to the Record on the first appeal of this 
case references page 581 as being the cover page of the Holzworth 
Deposition. Page 6 of the deposition is not in the Record. A 
true and correct copy of page 6 is attached as Addendum 3 to this 
Brief for the Court's convenience. 
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required to establish causation, the standard of care, and its 
breach." Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 640 
(Utah 1988). The management of flood waters in an underground 
conduit subject to complicated forces of nature and complex 
calculations of hydrology is just such a matter requiring 
"expert" testimony. Thrift Stores' attempt to provide such 
testimony was notably unsuccessful. In fact, Thrift Stores' own 
expert's testimony lead to the conclusion that the conduit could 
not have been plugged. Thus, lack of an inspection program could 
not have caused any damages. 
Thrift Stores' alleged expert, Dr. Lin testified that if the 
North Temple conduit was carrying more than 50% of its designed 
load during the flood prior to becoming clogged, the clog could 
not have existed prior to the flood.13 (Lin, p. 33, Exhibit 
"C"; R. 1079.) It is undisputed that, for several days during 
the flood, the conduit was carrying an amount of water in excess 
of its non-pressurized design capability and far more than 50% of 
its pressurized capabilities. (See Mitckes, Call and Butts 
Affidavits, Exhibits "I", "J" and "K"; R. 1149-63, 1164-6 and 
13Lin attempted to completely contradict his own testimony 
by making written changes to his deposition before signing. (R. 
1497.) Lin offered no reason for making any of his material 
changes nor any evidence to support them. They are simply naked 
conclusions with no support in the record. Therefore, the 
changes should be disregarded. See, Gaw v. State by and through 
Department of Transportation, 798 P.2d 1130, 1133 (Utah App. 
1990). Further, many of the handwritten notations on the Lin 
deposition attached as Exhibit "B" to Thrift Stores' Brief are 
not the same as those indicated on the reporter's transcript 
which is in the Record on Appeal. (R. 14 97.) Also, even Lin's 
changed testimony does not establish negligence or causation. 
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1167-9.) In fact, the conduit was carrying 160% of its 
unpressurized capacity and fully 80% of its pressurized capacity. 
In addition, Dr. Lin was only able to speculate that the 
plug in the North Temple conduit "could" have been in place prior 
to the May 1983 flood or, alternatively, "could" have been caused 
by the flood. The relevant part of his testimony states: 
Q. [Baird] How much of this material [which Lin 
claims made up the plug in the conduit] came down prior 
to the flood? 
A. [Lin] I don't know -- I didn't do any calculation. 
I don't have data to base any answer on that. 
Q. Could it have been six months? 
A. It could be two. 
Q. It could be two months? 
A. I mean, it could be. Yeah, it could be anything. 
(Lin, 18-19 (emphasis added), Exhibit "C"; R. 1064-5.) 
In making this conclusion, Lin relied solely on the 
testimony from Frank Helm, a City contractor hired during the 
flood to remove the obstructing material in North Temple. (Lin, 
p. 16, Exhibit "C"; R. 1062.) The Helm testimony relied upon by 
Lin reads as follows: 
Q. [Theodore] Could you tell how long that material 
had been in the pipe to become in a cementitious 
compaction? 
A. [Helm] No, I couldn't because I'm not a geologist. 
I wouldn't -- it could have been in two weeks or it 
could have been in two years or it could have came down 
with the flood from City Creek. 
Q. So you couldn't make an opinion one way or the 
other? 
A. No, sir, I wouldn't. 
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(Helm deposition, p. 24 (emphasis added); Exhibit "L" R. 
1173. ) 1 4 
Further, Lin's speculation in the possible pre-flood 
existence of the clog is based solely on his reading of Helm's 
description of the clog material as "cementitious" as meaning 
"dry".15 (Lin, pp. 18-22, Exhibit "C"; R. 1064-8.) In fact, 
Helm and others clearly stated that all the plug material was 
wet. (See Affidavits of Helm, Naser, Napier and Lyon, Exhibits 
"M", "N", "O" and "P" respectively; R. 1176-7, 1178-80, 1180-1 
and 1182-3.) 
In response to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
14Thrift Stores claims in its Brief that Dr. Lin testified 
that the conduit was plugged prior to the 1983 flood. (Brief, p. 
14.) As shown above, Dr. Lin gave no such opinion. Further, no 
facts, data or experience vested in Dr. Lin would have qualified 
him to so opine. At best, Dr. Lin's testimony was that the plug 
could have been made at any time including before the flood. 
This testimony is underpinned only on blind faith and speculation 
that any layman could make. It adds nothing to Thrift Stores' 
case. 
15At the most, Barry Sine and Wesley Sine would testify, 
according to their Answer to Salt Lake City Interrogatory No. 
2.11, that during the 1983 auguring operations to clean the 
conduit, they observed "that only the top 18 inches of the pipe 
section was filled with loose wet debris. The remaining two-
thirds of the pipe was filled with cement-like fine sediment, 
which was dry." (R. 997.) Of course, the Sines do not have any 
demonstrated expertise which would allow them to reach any such 
conclusion. Even assuming their testimony is true and the 
material was "dry" Lin was not relying in any way on the Sines' 
testimony in stating his conclusions. (Lin, pp. 13-15, Exhibit 
"C"; R. 1059-61.) Further, the Sines testimony is inadmissable 
because of the lack of any foundation or expertise on which to 
make any relevant conclusions. Even if this testimony were 
admissible, it is insufficient to preclude summary judgment in 
light of the overwhelming testimony of those who actually worked 
in the pipe during the flood or inspected it prior to the flood. 
(See Butts, Naser, Napier and Lyon Affidavits, Exhibits "K", "N", 
"O" and "P"; R. 1167-8, 1178-9, 1180-1 and 1182-3.) 
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long after discovery had been completed, Thrift Stores submitted 
a supplemental affidavit from Dr. Lin.16 (Lin Affidavit dated 
May 16, 1993 attached to Thrift Stores' Memorandum, R. 1481-5. 
This Affidavit is attached to Thrift Stores' Brief as Exhibit 
"A".) This Affidavit, to the extent that it changed Lin's 
deposition testimony, was precluded pursuant to Gaw v. State 
Department of Transportation, 798 P.2d 1130 (Utah App. 1990) .17 
Even this supplemental Affidavit, however, does not provide any 
evidence which would support a finding of negligence by the City. 
In addition, the Lin Affidavit failed to provide specific 
supporting factual bases for his views.18 
Further, the Affidavits do not establish the responsibility 
for any negligence beyond the mere res ipsa theory of 
speculation, i.e. someone must have done something wrong since 
something bad happened. This type of causation guesswork on 
behalf of a plaintiff does not establish negligence. Kitchen v. 
Cal Gas Co., 821 P.2d 458 (Utah App. 1991). 
It would be sheer speculation as to whether any inspection 
16The City has filed a Motion to strike Exhibit "A" to 
Thrift Stores' Brief. Exhibit "A" purports to be an Affidavit 
but it is neither signed nor notarized. 
17The City filed an Objection to Lin's Affidavit supported 
in the City's Reply Memorandum in support of Summary Judgment. 
(R. 1507-8 and 1515-18.) In violation of Rule 24(e), Utah 
R.App.P., Thrift Stores failed to point out to this Court that 
the Lin Affidavit was disputed. 
18Lin's new Affidavit was properly found by the District 
Court to not be a sufficient basis to deny summary judgment. (R. 
1578-80.) Nay v. General Motors Corporation, GMC, P.2d , 
210 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1993); Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 
97, 103 (Utah 1992) . 
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or maintenance policy would have discovered a pre-flood clog. In 
fact, the evidence demonstrates that a pre-flood inspection took 
place and no clog was discovered. Accordingly, there is no 
showing of any causal relationship between the flood inspection 
and maintenance program and the clog. Such speculation does not 
rise to the level required for Thrift Stores to meet their 
burden. The trial court correctly found against Thrift Stores 
and this Court should reach and identical conclusion. 
D. Damages. 
Thrift Stores' entire argument in its Brief concerning 
damages reads as follows: 
Through an affidavit by Barry Sine, facts are 
produced which show actual damages suffered 
as a result of the government's negligence. 
The amount of damages is in dispute and this 
creates a question for the jury. 
The record adequately supports a showing that 
the merchants demonstrated, and could produce 
evidence at trial supporting, facts which 
state a cause of action based on negligence. 
Critical facts are still in dispute. Summary 
judgment was, therefore, improper.19 
(Amended Brief of Thrift Stores, p. 28.) 
This phantom "damage" Affidavit of Barry Sine is referred to 
in Thrift Stores' Memorandum in Opposition to the City's Motion 
for Summary Judgment (R. 1461) but it was not, in fact, attached 
19The only damage evidence referenced in Thrift Stores Brief 
to this Court is to an Affidavit of Barry Sine which is simply 
not in the Record on appeal. (Exhibit "G" to Thrift Stores' 
Brief.) In addition to not being in the Record, the Affidavit 
is inadmissible as hearsay and completely lacks any foundation. 
The City objected to the Affidavit below (R. 1528-31) and has 
moved to strike the Affidavit from Thrift Stores Brief. 
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with Thrift Stores' Memorandum to the District Court, and was not 
included in the Record on Appeal.20 Accordingly Thrift Stores' 
damage allegations are completely without any evidentiary 
support. 
On January 12, 1991, Thrift Stores certified that it was 
ready for trial. On April 5, 1991, the District Court's briefly 
extended discovery cutoff expired. On April 15, 1991, the City 
took the deposition of Thrift Stores' "economic" damage expert, 
Merrill Norman. Mr. Norman testified that he had not calculated 
or determined damages on behalf of Thrift Stores. ((Norman, p. 
9-10, Exhibit "S", R. 1201-2.) In its' Amended Brief, Thrift 
Stores does not rely on any "damage" evidence from Norman. 
Pursuant to Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Thrift 
Stores must have been taken at its own word when its counsel (who 
was also the president of several of the Thrift Stores entities) 
certified that it was ready for trial. However, to the date of 
the City's Motion for Summary Judgment, and even to the date of 
20Assuming that Thrift Stores actually knows where the 
Affidavit is in the Record, Thrift Stores has not complied with 
Rule 24(e), Utah R. App. P. , by failing to cite to it. Failure 
to cite the Record allows this Court to disregard the factual 
claim even if it had any basis in reality. Fackrell v. Fackrell, 
740 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah 1987); Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, 
612-13 (Utah 1987); Steele v. Board of Review of Industrial 
Commission, 845 P.2d 960, 962 (Utah App. 1993). Further, the 
City objected below to even the mention of this not-in-the-record 
Affidavit (R. 1528-31) and Thrift Stores again violated Rule 
24(e), Utah R. App. P., by not informing this Court of challenge 
to the testimony. 
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this Brief, Thrift Stores has shown absolutely no damages.21 
Not only has Thrift Stores failed to sustain its burden of 
proving damages, but the cumulative evidence demonstrates clear 
support for the lower court's conclusion that there were no 
compensable damages suffered by Thrift Stores: 
1) At all times during the flood and the reconstruction of 
North Temple, except for possibly a few brief intervals, all of 
Thrift Stores' properties had alternative access from streets and 
roads other than North Temple. (Haines deposition, p. 33, 
Exhibit "G"; R. 1131. Peterson deposition, p. 63, Exhibit "H"; 
R. 1143.); 
2) Thrift Stores' own economic analysis shows that business 
continued at all of the Thrift Stores' businesses after the 
floods. (Exhibits "2"-"15" to the Norman deposition, Exhibit 
"Sff; R. 1257-80, See Fact 17.); 
3) Thrift Stores never provided to the City or the District 
21This lack of evidence is not cured by Thrift Stores' 
Answers to either the City's First or Second Set of 
Interrogatories. In its Answer to Interrogatory No. 14 of the 
City's First Set of Interrogatories, Thrift Stores indicated 
various damage figures would be testified to at trial by their 
accountant, Marv Harris. (R. 12 97-8.) However, Mr. Harris was 
not listed as a witness in Thrift Stores' Answers to the City's 
Second Set of Discovery and no evidence of damages for Mr. Harris 
was ever presented, despite repeated promises. (R. 1323-98.) 
As late as one month after Thrift Stores had certified readiness 
for trial, Thrift Stores continued to inform the City that its 
economic expert would be its accountant, Marv Harris (Exhibit 
"AA"; R. 1399.) Thrift Stores' second damage expert, Norman, who 
was not identified as an expert until after discovery cut-off and 
readiness for trial had been certified by Thrift Stores, 
testified that he had not seen any calculations from Mr. Harris 
and was not relying upon them. (Norman, p. 12, Exhibit "S"; R. 
1204.) 
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Court any calculation regarding damages. (Undisputed Facts 11124-
52 and the accompanying Exhibits to the City's Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.)22; 
4) In answer to the City's Second Set of Interrogatories, 
Thrift Stores identified Merrill Norman as its expert witness on 
damages and provided the City with Exhibits "1"-"10" prepared by 
Norman.23 (Exhibit "Z" , p. 9 and attachments thereto; R. 1331 
and 1389-98.); 
5) In the first four pages of the City's deposition of 
Norman, the City determined that Mr. Norman had not made a 
determination as to the damages suffered by Thrift Stores. 
Norman testified: 
Q. From the Exhibits I've just shown you, Exhibits 1-
10 [the only Exhibits attached to the Thrift Stores' 
Answers to the City's Second Set of Interrogatories], 
Sir, tell me the amount of damages suffered by each of 
the plaintiffs. 
A. We haven't made that determination yet. We've only 
examined the revenues, and we're not even complete with 
our revenue examination at the present time. 
Q. At this time you cannot tell me the amount of 
damages claimed by any of the plaintiffs' correct? 
22In failing to provide any proof of damages, Thrift Stores 
repeatedly failed to comply with discovery orders; failed to 
provide documents; and, omitted any reference to this action as 
an asset of the estate while under oath in at least two 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
23In answer to the City's Second Set of Interrogatories, No. 
2.4, Thrift Stores referenced to ten single sheet exhibits 
prepared by Mr. Norman as proof of their damages. (R. 13 89-98.) 
Mr. Norman admitted in his deposition that it was impossible to 
calculate Thrift Stores damages from these ten exhibits and that 
he had made no such damage calculations. (Norman, p. 9-10, 
Exhibit "S", R. 1201-2.) 
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A. Correct. 
(Norman, p. 9-10, Exhibit "S", R. 1201-2.); 
6) For the balance of the Norman deposition, Thrift Stores' 
counsel, Mr. Sine, (with sotto voce guidance from prior counsel 
despite his withdrawal) attempted to lead his own witness through 
a series of improper questions which the witness carefully 
answered, over objection, with caveats concerning the 
incompleteness of his investigation. (Norman, pp. 14-16, 26, 32-
4, and 54-5, Exhibit "S"; R. 1206-8, 1218, 1224-6 and 1246-7.); 
and 
7) During Thrift Stores' examination of Mr. Norman, 
Exhibits "11" through "14" to the deposition were produced by 
Thrift Stores' counsel even though they had not been provided as 
part of the Answers to Interrogatories and had not been produced 
by Norman pursuant to the Subpoena Duces Tecum during direct 
examination. Even these extra Exhibits do not, however, show any 
damage calculations. (Exhibits »iiM-»i4» to the Norman 
deposition and relevant examination at pp. 43-51, Exhibit "S"; R. 
1267-80 and 1235-43.) 
Accordingly, the City was entitled to Summary Judgment 
because Thrift Stores completely failed to meet its burden of 
proof in establishing damages. 
E. Conclusion. After noting that Thrift Stores had failed 
to comply with Rule 4-501(2) (b), C.J.A., the District Court 
expended considerable effort and went "the extra step" of 
investigating the totality of the record on its own. (Summary 
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Decision and Order; R. 1578; Addendum "2" to this Brief.) After 
that considerable effort, the District Court rejected Thrift 
Stores' claim for negligence, correctly ruling that, inter alia, 
the City owed no special duty to Thrift Stores. (R. 1579 and 
1581.) This Court should uphold that ruling. 
POINT II. 
THE CITY IS IMMUNE FROM THIS CLAIM OF NEGLIGENCE 




In Thrift Stores I, this Court held that the District 
Court's earlier grant of dismissal on the inspection immunity of 
Section 63-30-10 (1) (d) , U.C.A. was "too broad." Id. at 464. 
This Court observed that "[s]ome of plaintiffs' allegations of 
negligence, such as the removal of the grates, would seem to be 
unrelated to any inspection or lack thereof." Id. at 464.24 
The District Court was instructed to consider each allegation of 
negligence separately to determine whether the "inspection" 
immunity of subsection (1)(d) applied. 
24The issue of the alleged removal of the "grate" at the 
City Creek inlet to the flood conduit has disappeared because of 
a complete lack of any basis in fact. The witness whom Thrift 
Stores claimed would testify to the "grate" removal, in fact, 
testified in his deposition that he never saw the "grate" 
removed. He testified that at some time during the flood, a 
large solid steel plate (used to cover the inlet and divert the 
waters down State Street) was removed. (Anderson deposition, pp. 
16-22 and 41-42, Exhibit "CC"; R. 1405-13.) There has been no 
allegation or evidence by Thrift Stores that the placement or 
removal of this "plate" was negligent. Certainly, Lin made no 
such conclusion. 
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Lin's repeatedly testified that his conclusion of negligence 
consisted only of a supposed failure to have a "strong 
consistent, persistent maintenance program in place" (Lin, p. 31, 
Exhibit "C"; R. 1077.) He did not testify that such a 
maintenance program is an industry, engineering or practical 
standard in this type of conduit. He did not identify the 
elements that such a "program" would entail. He did not testify 
as to any other matter that would indicate that such a program 
should routinely take place absent an inspection that evidenced a 
problem requiring maintenance. 
The lower court reasonably determined that such a program of 
routine maintenance, as suggested by Dr. Lin, was not a separate 
and distinct responsibility for underground storm water conduits. 
Rather, maintenance was a consequence of inspection. That is, 
maintenance would normally only be done on this type of 
infrastructure if an inspection demonstrated the need to do so. 
Accordingly, the maintenance program suggested by Dr. Lin is part 
and parcel of the inspection function. The immunity provisions 
of subsection 10(1) (d) apply. The routine "program" which Lin 
wishes had been performed is within the "inspection" immunity, 
even if characterized as "maintenance". 
B. 
Discretionary Immunity. 
Further, given Lin's characterization of the alleged 
negligence as the lack of a "program" of inspection or 
maintenance, it is also clear that the "discretionary function" 
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preservation of immunity in Section 63-30-10(1) (a) also obtains. 
Specifically, the four tests of Thrift Stores I25 for 
"discretionary" immunity are all met here. 
First, this Court has already decided that flood water 
management is a basic governmental policy, program or objective. 
Thrift Stores I, Id at 463. Second, the question of the 
frequency (or, for that matter, the infrequency) of an inspection 
and/or routine maintenance program is essential to the 
realization of the flood management program objectives.26 
Paradoxically, the more vigorously that Thrift Stores assert 
the importance of having an inspection or maintenance "program" 
the more obviously such a "program" becomes discretionary. As 
this Court indicated in Duncan and Thrift Stores I, the more 
important a governmental goal, the more clearly are the 
implementing policies discretionary. Whether the discretion was 
exercised correctly is not the issue here. If discretion was 
exercised, whether correctly or incorrectly, the challenged act 
is immune. Thrift Stores I, 784 P.2d at 464; Duncan, 842 P.2d at 
835. 
The third discretionary immunity test is whether the act 
25The tests are derived from Little v. Utah State Division 
of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983). 
26This second "discretionary function" test analysis here is 
similar to that which this Court recently performed in Duncan v. 
Union Pacific Railroad Company, 842 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1992) . 
Just as evaluation of railroad crossings and prioritization for 
upgrading the warning devices is essential to highway safety so 
would a program of routine inspection and maintenance be 
essential to flood management safety. 
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requires the exercise of basic judgment and expertise. (Little, 
667 P.2d at 51.) The frequency or infrequency of an inspection 
and maintenance program obviously relies upon the expertise of 
the governmental agency involved. Again, the Duncan analysis 
affirms this conclusion. 
Finally, and indisputably, the City, assuming it had any 
responsibility for flood management at all (see Point I.A. 
above), would have possessed the requisite authority to have an 
inspection and maintenance program. Thus, the fourth 
discretionary immunity test is met. The City's actions regarding 
the conduit before the flood are discretionary functions immune 
from suit.27 
POINT III 
USE OF THE "DRAG BUCKET" WAS NOT NEGLIGENT. 
Thrift Stores' second claim for negligence was that the 
City's use of a "drag bucket" within the North Temple system was 
"not accepted engineering practice . . . ." (R. 1460-1. ) 2 8 The 
27The United States Supreme Court has recently construed the 
analogous "discretionary function" exemption under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §2680 (a), to be even broader than the 
this Court has interpreted the State provisions. In United 
States v. Gaubert, 113 L.Ed.2d 335, 499 U.S. (1992), the 
Supreme Court held that the federal "discretionary function" 
exception even retained sovereign immunity for matters which 
might be considered of a "routine or frequent nature" if they 
involved the "exercise of choice and judgment." 113 L.Ed.2d 354. 
This Court should recognize a similar test for "discretionary 
immunity". The program of flood system inspection and/or 
maintenance certainly qualifies as a matter of choice and 
judgment and is therefore immunized. 
28The "drag bucket" was an attempt to put a large bucket 
into the plugged pipe and pull the bucket through the pipe. This 
process was intended to drag the debris out with the bucket. 
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lower court correctly found that Thrift Stores had failed to 
prove any injury. (R. 1579.) While there is ample basis for 
this Court to sustain the lower court's conclusions on that basis 
alone, this Court may affirm the Summary Judgment on any grounds 
that were available to the lower court. Higgins v. Salt Lake 
County, P.2d , , 213 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 10 (Utah 1993), 
citing Hill v. Seattle First National Bank, 827 P.2d 214, 246 
(Utah 1992). Under the four elements of actionable negligence 
set forth in Reeves, supra, and discussed in detail in Point I, 
Thrift Stores must again be determined to have failed to meet its 
burden on each of these requirements. 
A. Duty. 
While emergency situations do not excuse a party from a duty 
of care, the law recognizes that the duty becomes that applicable 
in the emergency situation rather than the duty which would be 
imposed during a time of quiet contemplation. Covert v. 
Kennecott Copper Corp., 23 Utah 2d 252, 461 P.2d 466 (1969). The 
City admits that it had a duty to undertake its volunteer efforts 
to clear the conduit with reasonable care under the exigent 
circumstances existing during a natural disaster. This admission, 
however, is of no avail to Thrift Stores. 
Lin, in his deposition testimony and affidavits, fails to 
acknowledge the emergency conditions under which the "drag 
bucket" was used. A part of the street providing the main access 
(Peterson deposition, pp. 54-55, Exhibit "H"; R. 1140-1. 
Talebreza deposition, pp. 15-16, Exhibit "Q"; R. 1186-7.) 
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to the State Capitol was turned, virtually overnight, into a 
raging river. The Record is replete with descriptions of the 
magnitude of the natural disaster which befell the City and the 
even greater magnitude of the heroic acts of the City and its 
citizens in narrowly avoiding ruin. (See Salt Lake City's 
Answers No. 14, Exhibit "A"; R. 1020-3. Johnson/Peterson 
Affidavit, Exhibit "BM; R. 1029-35. Call deposition, pp. 8-9; R. 
1119-20.) Thus, Thrift Stores has failed to introduce any 
evidence on the required duty in an emergency situation. 
The City, its personnel and thousands of volunteers 
undertook to manage the flood in a manner that would best 
facilitate the best result for the public's interest under the 
exigent circumstances existing at that time. There is no 
evidence that the City's assumption of this duty was specifically 
for the protection of Thrift Stores. Accordingly, even if a duty 
of care had been established in the Record, it would not have 
been the required "special" duty. 
The general duty owed under these circumstances does not, 
however, provide any basis for Thrift Stores' claim. Thrift 
Stores must still establish that a special relationship existed 
between the City and Thrift Stores and that the City owed Thrift 
Stores a "special duty" as a result of that relationship. (See 
Point I.A.) On this claim, as with all others, Thrift Stores has 
failed, in toto, to demonstrate the existence of such a "special 
duty". 
B. Breach of duty. 
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As set forth in Point I.B., there can be no breach of duty 
where there is no duty. Once again, Thrift Stores relied upon 
the purported expertise of Dr. Lin to prove an allegation of 
negligence. This in spite of the fact that Dr. Lin admitted that 
he had no experience in the actual management of flood waters. 
(Lin, p. 30, (Exhibit "C"); R. 1076.) At best he may have 
studied a few floods in systems completely different from that in 
the instant circumstance (e.g. open channels or stream beds) and 
may have designed a few completely unrelated storm drainage 
control systems. The proposed testimony of Lin thus failed to 
meet the admissability standards of Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Lin's unsupported speculation about the "drag bucket", 
even if correct, was not premised on knowledge or expertise which 
could assist the trier of fact in resolving the issues before it. 
See Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 89 (Utah App. 1989) . 
In addition, Lin admitted that use of the "drag bucket" 
would have been reasonable if such "drag bucket" operations had 
been successfully used in the past. (Lin, pp. 41-42, Exhibit 
"C"; R.1087-8.) "Drag bucket" operations have been used 
successfully in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, throughout Utah 
and are a standard and widely accepted method for attempting to 
clean blocked underground pipes.29 (Affidavits of Call, Butts 
and Glen Markus, Exhibit "J", "K" and "R", respectively; R. 1164-
29In fact, the "drag bucket" was, unfortunately, not 
successful in removing the clog. The procedure was abandoned in 
favor of excavating the conduit from the road surface because of 
the length of the clog. (Salt Lake City's Answers No. 4; R. 
1020-3.) 
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6, 1167-9 and 1190-2.) 
The facts are undisputed. The use of "drag buckets" is one 
of the accepted tools and procedures for cleaning clogged drain 
pipes. Further there was no showing of any relationship of the 
"drag bucket's" failure causing Thrift Stores any harm. The City 
was therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, 
Reeves and Nay, supra. 
C. Proximate cause. 
Thrift Stores has never produced any evidence showing that 
the use of the "drag bucket" caused any additional sections of 
the road to be removed, prolonged the surface channeling of the 
diverted flood waters or delayed the reconstruction of North 
Temple. In fact, Dr. Lin's testimony establishes the de minimus 
nature of the effect of the "drag bucket." He testified: 
Q. What harm did it do? 
A. As one more item to be cleared? 
Q. But did it take any longer to clear the bucket than 
to clear the rest of this six-block-long clog, sir? 
A. No -- I mean, a little bit longer, yes. 
Q. What? 15 seconds, a minute? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. But no more than a couple of minutes? 
MR. THEODORE: Objection. That mischaracterizes the 
record with Helm's testimony. 
Q. (By Mr. Baird) How long extra did it take to clear 
the block because the plug was in there, sir, as you 
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understand it -- because the bucket was there? 
A. Hour, something like that. 
(Lin, p. 42 (emphasis added), Exhibit "C"; R. 1088.) 
Q. So that's the only harm that it caused, correct, 
was the extra hour to clean it out? 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). Yes. 
(Lin, p. 43-44 (emphasis added), Exhibit "C"; R. 1089-90.) 
In an attempt to rehabilitate Lin's testimony, Thrift 
Stores' counsel called Lin's attention to testimony from the 
Frank Helm deposition concerning an allegation that the "drag 
bucket" somehow made the auguring operations "a little more 
complicated". (Lin, pp. 44-45, Exhibit "C"; R. 1090-1.) But 
even that effort belied Helm's actual testimony. Helm stated 
that the "drag bucket" did not interfere at all with Helm's 
auguring work and that the City acted reasonably and cleaned the 
conduit as expeditiously as possible. (Helm Affidavit, Exhibit 
"M"; R. 1176-7. Butts Affidavit, "Exhibit "K"; R. 1167-9.) 
D. Damages. 
The District Court searched through the file for any 
evidence which might support this claim, again without the 
required Rule 4-501 assistance from Thrift Stores and reached the 
following conclusion: 
There is some testimony from [Lin] that the use of a 
drag line was not good engineering practice. The only 
consequence flowing from this to which Lin testified 
was that it complicated auguring, delayed auguring for 
some indeterminate period and reflected panic 
management. Assuming the use of the drag line was 
negligent, there is no admissible evidence that such 
use caused any damage. 
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(R. 1579, emphasis added.) 
The District Court correctly found that Thrift Stores had 
failed to prove any injury. The Court's conclusions were well 
founded. (See the detailed argument on damages in Point I.D., 
above.) 
E. Conclusion. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the use of the "drag bucket" 
was negligent, Thrift Stores' "expert" has not made a prima facie 
showing of any proximate causal relationship between the use of 
the "drag bucket" and any of Thrift Stores' hypothetical damages. 
The Record demonstrates that the "drag bucket" caused absolutely 
no delays. (See Facts Nos. 30 and 31 and Affidavits of Butts and 
Helm, Exhibits "K" and "L"; R. 1167-9 and 1170-5.) 
POINT IV. 
UNDER THE FLOOD DISASTER CONDITION, THE "DRAG 
BUCKET" USE WAS A "DISCRETIONARY" POLICY 
DECISION AND THEREFORE IMMUNE. 
The decision to use the "drag bucket" by City management 
personnel, in an attempt to alleviate the flood emergency, 
clearly meets the first, third and fourth "discretionary" 
immunity tests set forth in Thrift Stores I at p. 463. Relieving 
the emergency flood waters was (1) a basic governmental objective 
which; (3) required the exercise of judgment and expertise; and 
which was, (4) within the City's lawful authority. 
Given the emergency situation, the City management personnel 
on site reasonably believed that the decision to use the "drag 
bucket" was essential to the realization of the flood 
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management - the second "discretionary" test. (Call Affidavit, 
Exhibit "J"; R. 1164-6.) Further, in Call's uncontroverted 
opinion, a decision under the circumstances to use or not use the 
"drag bucket" would have changed the course of the flood 
management policy program and objective. (Call Affidavit, 
Exhibit "J"; R. 1166.) To use the words of the United States 
Supreme Court in Gaubert, 113 L.Ed.2d at 352, 499 U.S. at : 
"It is plain to us that [ ] the challenged actions involved the 
exercise of choice and judgment." 
The decision to attempt one reasonable solution over another 
is at the very core of discretionary immunity. Duncan, supra. 
That very type of discretionary decision making was evidenced 
herein and the immunity contemplated by Section 63-30-10(a) 
should attached. 
POINT V. 
THRIFT STORES' OTHER FOUR ALLEGATIONS 
OF NEGLIGENCE ARE UNSUPPORTED. 
In its Memorandum in Opposition to the City's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Thrift Stores raised four other areas of 
alleged negligence:30 
3) The City's use of a 12-inch augur the first 
part of June, rather than a 48-inch augur, 
delaying the cleaning of storm drain for over 
a week (Affidavit Dr. Lin). 
4) The City's employment of blasting within the 
clogged enclosed pipe the first part of June, 
delaying the auguring and cleaning of the 
North Temple storm drain (Affidavit Dr. Lin) 
30The City has reproduced these four allegations exactly as 
they appeared in Thrift Stores' Memorandum. 
37 
The City has filed no affidavits contravening 
this allegation; 
5) The City's use of fire hoses the first part 
of June to try and remove debris from the 
enclosed pipe, delaying the auguring and 
cleaning of the North Temple storm drain 
(Affidavit Dr. Lin) The City has filed no 
affidavits contravening this allegation; 
6) In addition, if Salt Lake City was 
encountering debris flows out of City Creek, 
and elected to interrupt its flow through the 
North Temple conduit by placing a metal plate 
over the inlet as alleged in its memorandum, 
it was negligent in operating the culvert by 
allowing debris to settle out when the flows 
were interrupted. (see Affidavit of Dr. Lin 
attached hereto and by this reference 
incorporated herein. 
(R. 1461.) 
Again, after diligently searching through the record with no 
Rule 4-501(2)(b) assistance from Thrift Stores, the District 
Court rejected these four theories. It observed: 
The Court can find no reference in the Lin affidavits 
or the Lin deposition to the preference for a 48-inch 
augur over a 12-augur or to the use of fire hoses to 
clean debris. Furthermore, while the December 10 
affidavits suggests it is not good engineering practice 
to utilize blasting for debris removal, there is no 
evidence of how blasting caused plaintiffs' damage. 
Consequently, defendants' alleged negligence due to the 
method of auguring and use of fire hoses and a 
causative link between blasting and plaintiffs' damage 
have no evidentiary support. 
(R. 1579-80.) 
The discussion of these four issues of negligence occurs in 
Thrift Stores' amended Brief at pages 26 and 27. No fact showing 
any negligence related to these four items is referenced. The 
only citation to the Record, in the Brief, is to an Affidavit of 
Dr. Lin. This is one of the Affidavits which the District Court 
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found to be completely lacking in any evidentiary support for 
Thrift Stores' conclusion of negligence. (R. 1579-80.) Even a 
cursory review of the Affidavit establishes the propriety of the 
District Court's grant of Summary Judgment on this issue. In 
addition, as noted, supra, the Lin Affidavit referred to is 
inadmissible pursuant to Gaw, Butterfield. Nay and Kitchen. 
Even Dr. Lin did not conclude that the City was negligent in 
other areas. In his deposition, he testified: 
Q. Other than maintenance, tell me every 
item in which -- every action or inaction of 
Salt Lake City employees or agents which 
after the flood began you contend was 
negligent. 
A. I can't say that. I mean, after the 
flood begins, then I don't have any claim on 
that -- my -- as far as my knowledge of the 
operation goes. But my claim was prior -- I 
mean, all along they have to maintain the 
thing. 
(Lin, pp. 31-32 (emphasis added), Exhibit "C"; R. 1077-8.) 
Thrift Stores, on each of these peripheral allegations, has 
failed to establish any of the elements essential to sustaining a 
negligence claim against the City. In addition, as with its 
other two claim, Thrift Stores has presented no evidence of 
damages allegedly flowing from these claims. The District Court 
correctly identified these shortcomings and held that they were 
fatal to Thrift Stores' claims. This Court should do likewise. 
Finally, it should be noted, that each of the allegations 
set forth, supra, even if actionable, fall clearly within the 
discretionary immunity provisions of Section 63-30-10(9). (See 
Points II and IV, above.) 
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POINT VI. 
THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS MUST BE DISMISSED. 
Thrift Stores' Complaint named four individual defendants: 
Ted Wilson, Al Haynes [sic], Max Peterson and Rick Johnston. 
While the Complaint referenced that these individuals worked for 
Salt Lake City, the Complaint did not state that they were being 
sued in any representative capacity and the prayer for relief 
lists the "defendants" jointly as responsible for all of Thrift 
Stores' alleged damages. 
The City's First Set of Interrogatories, No. 24, inquired as 
to whether or not Thrift Stores' contended that these individuals 
"acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice within the meaning 
of Section 63-30-4, U.C.A., 1953, which might expose them to 
personal liability. Thrift Stores objected to this interrogatory 
on the grounds of relevance, but promised to answer the 
interrogatory upon completion of discovery. (See Answer to 
Interrogatory No. 24; R. 1303.) No such supplementation has been 
received by the City. 
Section 63-30-4, U.C.A., allows actions against individuals 
in their non-representative capacity only upon a showing of fraud 
or malice. Madsen v. Borthick, P.2d , 210 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 
(Utah 1993) . There has been absolutely no claim or showing of 
fraud or malice. None could have been alleged in good faith as 
required by Rule 11, U.R.C.P. Therefore, the individual 
defendants must be dismissed. 
Further, any action against the individuals in their 
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representative capacities would be pointless. Pursuant to 
Section 63-30-20, U.C.A., any judgment against the City in this 
action would bar any judgment against the individual employees of 
the City. Also, there is absolutely no showing that the 
individual defendants' presence was in any way necessary to this 
action because the City, County and State are named and served 
defendants. The naming of individual officers or employees as 
defendants serves no legitimate purpose. The individual 
defendants should be dismissed. 
POINT VII. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS GRANTED, IN PART, BASED ON 
RULE 4-501, C.J.A. NON-COMPLIANCE SHOULD BE 
REVIEWED ON A STANDARD FAVORING THE DECISION 
BELOW. 
The City does not dispute that one of the basic appellate 
rules of common law is that summary judgments will be reviewed 
with the benefit of all factual inferences in favor of the non-
moving party. Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 
954 (Utah 1992) . The reason for this general standard is 
obvious. Because the party opposing summary judgment is entitled 
to a trial in the event that any reasonable conclusion which 
could be drawn from the evidence would support liability, the 
appellate court must diligently look for any such evidence, no 
matter how thin. 
It is precisely the difficulty of proving a negative which 
led to the enactment of Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial 
Administration. District Court judges should not be required to 
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guess as to disputes of fact nor should they be required to look 
for needles in the haystacks of evidence generated by modern 
discovery practices. Parties opposing summary judgment are 
required by Rule 4-501(2) (b) to: 
[b]egin [their memorandum] with a section that contains 
a concise statement of material facts as to which the 
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed 
fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and 
shall specifically refer to those portions of the 
record upon which the opposing party relies and, if 
applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or 
sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. All 
material facts set forth in the movant's statement and 
properly supported by an accurate reference to the 
record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of 
summary judgment unless specifically controverted by 
the opposing party's statement. 
(Emphas is added.) 
The City (and the County and State) complied with its 
obligation under Rule 4-501(2)(a) and provided the District Court 
with 57 Undisputed Facts supported by 29 Exhibits of admissible 
evidence. (R. 978-92, and 1013-1415.) Thrift Stores' response 
to the City's motion was, to quote the District Court, "wholly 
inadequate" and "failed to adhere to [the] requirements of 4-
501(2)(b)." (R. 1576-7.) 
Because of Thrift Stores' failure, the District Court was 
burdened with the task of looking for any evidence which might 
support Thrift Stores' contention. Such a burden should not be 
imposed on the District Courts. The District Courts should act 
as judges and not as advocates/investigators for the party 
opposing summary judgment. This Court should relieve that burden 
and conflict from the District Court. 
42 
The City suggests that this Court adopt the following rule: 
Any fact submitted in support of summary judgment by 
the moving party in compliance with Rule 4-501(2) (a), 
C.J.A. shall be taken as true unless properly 
contravened by the opposing party pursuant to Rule 4-
501(2) (b) . 
This Court should further establish a rule that: 
Disputed material facts not properly substantiated by 
the party opposing summary judgment, as required by 
Rule 4-501(2) (b), will not be considered by this Court 
as grounds for reversing a grant of summary judgment. 
Both of these rules could contain the usual caveat that they 
will not be applied if they result in "manifest injustice" or if 
the decision below was "plain error". Cf. Crookston v. Fire 
Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991). 
This standard of review proposed by the City for summary 
judgment cases is similar to that which this Court applies when a 
party below fails to properly object to evidence or fails to 
request a jury instruction. See, Crookston, supra and Lopez v. 
Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778, 780 (Utah 1986). District Court 
judges are not required to make objections for a party nor to 
instruct the jury on special issues, unless requested by a party. 
Similarly, the District Court should not have to act as an 
advocate for a party opposing summary judgment. 
A policy from this Court establishing such rules would be in 
the interest of judicial economy and in the quality of legal 
representation. District Courts, and parties obtaining summary 
judgment from them, should be entitled to the same protections 
which this Court has given itself from improper briefs pursuant 
to Rule 24. See, Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah 
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1987); Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, 613 (Utah 1987); Steele v. 
Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 845 P.2d 960, 962 (Utah 
App. 1993) . 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the passage of more than a decade since the flood, 
Thrift Stores has completely failed to prove the existence of a 
duty owed by the City to Thrift Stores related to the flood of 
1983, the breach of any duty, proximate cause or damages. The 
Thrift Stores witness, Lin, offered absolutely no admissible or 
useful testimony. Lin's only testimony was: (a) that the lack 
of a "program" of routine inspection and maintenance "could", 
speculatively, have allowed a plug in the conduit to be in 
existence before the flood; and, (b) that the City's use of "drag 
bucket" may have "briefly delayed" or slightly complicated the 
auguring operations. Even this testimony from Lin was 
inadmissible, as being contradictory to his own deposition, 
failing to reference specific facts and simply being res ipsa-
tyPe guesswork. 
Any responsibility to inspect or maintain the North Temple 
conduit lay, in fact and by law, with Salt Lake County. Absent a 
duty on behalf of the City to inspect or maintain the conduit, 
the District Court was correct in dismissing Thrift Stores' claim 
against the City. Further, any duty which might have existed 
would have been to the public at large and not an actionable 
"special duty" in favor of Thrift Stores. 
It is not disputed that the passage of huge amounts of flood 
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water through the North Temple conduit (i n the early stages of 
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explain why, as matter of law, this alleged negligence in any way 
proximately caused any of Thrift Stores' alleged damages. 
Thrift Stores has, also, completely failed to prove any 
damages. At most, despite language certifying their readiness 
for trial and a one month passing of the discovery cutoff, Thrift 
Stores' expert testified only that certain "revenues" were lost 
by Thrift Stores. The expert admitted that these revenues were 
not coextensive with Thrift Stores' damages and that he had no 
proof of any damages. Thrift Stores' other alleged support for 
its damages claim, an Affidavit of Barry Sine, is not in the 
Record and cannot be considered. Even if it were in the Record, 
it is inadmissable as hearsay, without foundation and is 
insufficient to raise a genuine dispute of material fact. 
Finally, this Court should use the opportunity of this case 
to send a message to the District Courts and the Bar regarding 
the importance of complying with Rule 4-501(2) of the Code of 
Judicial Administration. It is manifestly unfair to require 
District Courts to serve as factual investigators for parties 
opposing summary judgment when the party itself fails to comply 
with Rule 4-501(2)(b). If a party opposing summary judgment 
fails to guide the District Court to material factual disputes 
adequately supported by admissible evidence this Court should 
review the grant of summary judgment with the presumptions in 
favor of sustaining the District Court's grant of summary 
j udgment. 
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• Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-30-3, 1953, as in effect in 
983: 
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit. 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this act, all 
governmental entities are immune from suit for any 
injury which results from the exercise of a 
governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, 
nursing home, or other governmental health care 
facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, or 
other professional health care clinical training 
program conducted in either public or private 
facilities. 
• Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-30-10(1), 1953, as in effect 
in 1983: 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by 
negligent act or omission of employee -- Exceptions --
Waiver for injury caused by violation of fourth 
amendment rights. (1) Immunity from suit of all 
governmental entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee 
committed within the scope of his employment except if 
the injury: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or the 
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary 
function, whether or not the discretion is abused, or 
• * * 
(d) arises out of a failure to make an inspection, or 
by reason of making an inadequate or negligent 
inspection of any property, . . . 
• Rule 4-501(2), Code of Judicial Administration: 
(2) Motions for Summary Judgment. 
(a) Memorandum in Support of Motion. The points and 
authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment 
shall begin with a section that contains a concise 
statement of material facts as to which movant contends 
no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in 
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically 
refer to those portions of the record upon which the 
movant relies. 
(b) Memorandum in Opposition to a Motion. The points 
and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment shall begin with a section that contains a 
concise statement of materials facts as to which the 
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed 
fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and 
shall specifically refer to those portions of the 
record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if 
applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or 
sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. All 
materials facts set forth in the movant's statement and 
properly supported by an accurate reference to the 
record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of 
summary judgment unless specifically controverted by 
the opposing party's statement. 
ADDENDUM 2 T^.fO Jt*: > '-• O^sct 
SEP <* 1991 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IOCKY MOUNTAIN THRIFT STORES, : SUMMARY DECISION 
INC., dba HOPE OF AMERICA AND ORDER 
THRIFT STORE, et al. , : 
Plaintiffs, : CIVIL NO- C-83-6678 
vs. : 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, : 
a municipal corporation of 
the State of Utah, et al., : 
Defendants. : 
This matter comes before the Court on a series of motions: 
defendants' motions for summary judgment; plaintiffs' motion to 
amend the complaint; and defendant Salt Lake City's motion for 
contempt. Plaintiffs claim that the defendants' negligence in 
managing the flood waters of 1983 and specifically the North 
Temple storm drain caused serious disruption to plaintiffs' 
businesses when North Temple had to be excavated. 
Both of the remaining defendants, Salt Lake City ("the 
City") and Salt Lake County ("the County") have moved for 
summary judgment on numerous grounds. Plaintiffs' responses to 
these motions is wholly inadequate. Plaintiffs have failed to 
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adhere to there requirements of Rule 4-501(2) (b). This failure 
is significant in a complex case such as this where adherence 
to the rule is a necessity for the Court to sort through 
complex theories, allegations and factual setting. If the 
Court in this Summary Decision has misapprehended or failed to 
acknowledge any genuine issue of material fact, it is because 
plaintiffs have not adhered to Rule 4-501 or otherwise submit 
their theories and evidence in an understandable manner. 
On remand from the Supreme Court, this Court should 
determine whether the alleged negligence related to inspection 
or to maintenance and operation, whether the alleged negligence 
was the result of policy decisions or operational decisions, 
and other defenses raised by defendants. Rocky Mountain Thrift 
Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459, 464 (1989). 
In response to the defendants' claim that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact concerning their negligence, 
plaintiffs suggest the following areas of negligence have some 
evidentiary support: (1) failure to clean the storm drain 
prior to the flood; (2) the use of a dragline which in turn 
allegedly precluded the use of augering equipment; (3) the use 
of a 12 inch auger rather than a 48 inch auger; (4) the use of 
blasting in the clogged drain; (5) the use of fire hoses; (6) 
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the covering of the inlet with a metal plate and allowing 
debris to thereafter settle. 
In support of their claim that genuine issues of material 
fact exist concerning the six areas of alleged negligence, 
plaintiffs refer to the deposition of Dr. Clark A. Lin and his 
affidavit. Never do plaintiffs refer to page numbers in the 
Lin deposition nor do they reference a particular affidavit of 
Lin. The Court has gone the extra step of reviewing the 
entirety of the Lin deposition of April 22, 1991. 
Additionally, the Court has reviewed the May 16, 1991 affidavit 
of Lin which was attached to one of plaintiffs' responsive 
memoranda. In reviewing the materials submitted by the City in 
support of its motion, the Court discovered an earlier 
affidavit of Lin dated December 10, 1990. Plaintiffs did not 
direct the Court's attention to that particular affidavit. If 
there are any other affidavits of Lin, the Court is unaware and 
no further specific affidavits have been referenced. 
Construing the December 10, 1990 and May 16, 1991 
affidavits and the Lin deposition in a light most favorable to 
plaintiffs, the following can be inferred: defendants were 
negligent in failing "to employ a program of maintenance and 
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inspection to insure that the pipes are kept clean." At 
times Lin used the terms "maintenance" and "inspection" 
interchangeably, but it is clear that a regular "program" of 
inspection would be either the precursor to or a part of 
maintenance* As such, it is subject to either the applicable 
statutory provision immunizing government conduct relating to 
inspections or failures to inspect or is the result of a policy 
decision not to have a regular 'program for inspection and 
maintenance and thus entitled to discretionary immunity. Under 
either scenario, defendants' claimed negligence due to failure 
to inspect and maintain is within the legislated governmental 
immunity. See, Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., supra. 
There is some testimony from him that the use of a dragline 
was not good engineering practice. The only consequence 
flowing from this to which Lin testified was that it 
complicated augering, delayed augering for some indeterminant 
period and reflected panic management. Even assuming the use 
of the dragline was negligent, there is no admissible evidence 
that such use caused any damage. 
1
 December 10, 1990 affidavit, paragraph 11. 
Substantially the same statement is repeated in paragraph 12 
and in the May 16, 1991 affidavit, paragraph 12. 
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The Court can find no reference in the Lin affidavits or 
the Lin deposition to the preference for a 48 inch auger over a 
12 inch auger or to the use of fire hoses to clean debris. 
Furthermore, while the December 10 affidavit suggests it is not 
jood engineering practice to utilize blasting for debris 
removal, there is no evidence of how blasting caused 
plaintiffs' damage. Consequently, defendants' alleged 
legligence due to the method of augering and use of fire hoses 
and a causative link between blasting and plaintiffs' damage 
lave no evidentiary support. 
The sole remaining factual issue submitted by plaintiffs 
Involves the allegation that the defendants were negligent in 
Interrupting the flow by capping the inlet pipe. There is but 
Dne reference to this in the testimony of Lin. This occurs in 
paragraph 14 of the May 16 affidavit. There Lin suggests the 
:onseguence of the capping was that the pipe thereafter became 
)lugged. Throughout his deposition, however, he steadfastly 
:estified that the pipe became plugged before the flood. (Lin 
leposition, pp. 12, 13, 18, 22). Moreover, in the deposition 
Le testified that his claim of negligence related to pre-flood 
:onduct. (Lin deposition, pp. 31-32). The affidavit 
-eference to the capping of the inlet pipe is at best oblique. 
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Furthermore, there is no factual basis for the premise that the 
pipe became plugged after the flood began and plaintiffs' 
expert denies the premise. 
The above analysis indicates that there is no genuine issue 
of material fact concerning each of the alleged theories of 
negligence. Additionally, the Court is further persuaded that 
plaintiffs have not demonstrated a duty owed to them sufficient 
to overcome the showing necessitated by Feree v. State, 784 
P.2d 149 (Utah 1989). Such a showing is particularly necessary 
in a case such as this where the claimed injury is not the 
inundation of property but the loss of business revenues due to 
the difficulties of consumer ingress and egress. Defendants 
are therefore entitled to Summary Judgment. This determination 
renders moot the City's request for sanctions and plaintiffs' 
Motion to Amend Complaint. 
The City's motion for contempt is denied. The allegations 
of unprofessional and unethical conduct are not within the 
Court's contempt powers. If counsel believes there has been a 
breach of the governing rules of conduct, referral should be 
made to the Utah State Bar. 
Dated this V day of September, 1991. 
/ - ^ 
/MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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ADDENDUM 3 
1 we got into the middle of May. 
2 Q Then basically did you do anything with respect to 
3 J the pipeline itself along the North Temple viaduct? Was it 
cleaned out? 
A We did not go to any efforts to specifically clean 
that conduit, tfe had opportunity to be ia that, I can't give 
you a specific date, sometime between the fall of 1982 and 
the spring runoff, to repair one of the manholes out there out 
near the Fairgrounds, and we didn't have a report from our 
field people that there was any obstruction or accumulation 
in that storm drain, so we didn't have any reason to believe 
that it wouldn't flow freely. 
Q When you say you had the opportunity, was that 
routine requests that came in to repair the manhole, or was it 
some other factor precipitating? 
A No, it was a request. The Salt Lake County work 
crews identified it to put a cover on that manhole, and we 
were out there responding to it. 
Q Along the North Temple segment between Sixth and 
Eighth West, are the manholes of the type that can be bolted 
down to maintain pressure? 
A The manholes are there that were there, but they are 
not bolted down type manholes. In addition to that, the 
lateral drainage of that entire region was connected directly 
to that main conduit, so the pressurizing would only be 
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